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ADMISSIBILITY OF ORAL DECLARATIONS OF A TESTATOR TO PROVE A LOST WILL IN KENTUCKY*
It is established beyond question that the fact that a will
has been lost or destroyed or cannot be found does not of itself
prevent the probate of the will in Kentucky' In order to probate
such a will its due execution, its contents, and the fact that it
was never revoked by the testator must be clearly shown. 2 Since
the will itself cannot be found, each of the three essential elenients must be established by secondary or extrinsic evidence.
Evidence offered for this purpose usually consists of testimony
of attesting witnesses, testimony of draftsmen, testimony of
other persons who have read the will, evidence of oral declarations of the testator made during his lifetime, or testimony concerning the will's physical existence and the surrounding circumstances tending to rebut any presumption that it was revoked by the testator.
When and for what purposes oral declarations of the testator may be admitted is a question surrounded with much confusion and nsunderstanding. There appears to be little question as to the admissibility of ante-testamentary declarations
to show a testamentary design or plan. 3 Such declarations are
admitted quite generally on the theory that the existence of a
design or plan is some evidence that the design or plan was
*This note concerns lost wills only and does not purport to deal
with the admissibility of the testator's declarations to impeach the
validity of a will complete on its face by showing duress, undue influence, etc.
' Rowland v. Holt, 253 Ky 718, 70 S.W 2d 5 (1934), Muller v.
Muller, 108 Ky. 511, 56 S.W 802 (1900) Steele v. Price, 44 Ky. (5 B.
Mon.) 58 (1844) Beall v. Cunningham, 42 Ky. (3 B. Mon.) 390
George
(1843) Baker v. Dobyns, 34 Ky (4 Dana) 220 (1836)
Payne's Will, 20 Ky. (4 T. B. Mon.) 422 (1827)
"Madden v. Sevier, 271 Ky. 688, 113 S.W 2d 41 (1938), Pritchard v. Harvey, 272 Ky. 58, 113 S.W 2d 865 (1938) Ferguson v.
Billups, 244 Ky. 85, 50 S.W 2d 35 (1932).
Proof of the same three elements is required in other jurisdictions generally. Evans, The Probate of Lost Wills (1945) 24 NEB.
L. REV. 283.
"The admissibility of such evidence, on the analysis just out-

lined, is entirely settled." 6
1735.

WIGMORE, EVIDENCE

(3d ed. 1940) sec.
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carried out. If one clearly indicates his intention to make a will
of a certain tenor, evidence of that intention will have some probative value in determining whether or not the will was actually
made. 4 Post-testamentary declarations raise a more serious
question, for here the testator is declaring upon a fact done, and
if another is permitted to testify as to that declaration when the
fact declared upon is the point in issue it would seem, on first
impression, that the testimony is nothing more than hearsay and
must necessarily be excluded. Since the Kentucky courts have
made little or no distinction between statements made by the
testator before he executed his will and those made after the
execution5 and since the question concerning the ante-testamentary declarations has hardly been raised in this state, this discussion will be confined to the admissibility of post-testamentary
declarations.
Some courts and some legal writers have taken the position
that although such declarations are hearsay, they are often the
only evidence available and therefore should be admitted as a
proper exception to the hearsay rule.0 The courts announcingsuch a doctrine usually cite the English case of Sugden v Lord
St. Leonards7 as authority and then apparently consider their
position secure. The Sugdeu case held that the testator's oral
declarations made after the execution of his will were admissible
to prove its contents. The case is somewhat weakened by the fact
that the decision was by a divided court and that there was
ample evidence to sustain the will without the testator's declarations. Sugden v Lord St. Leonards has not yet been overruled
'1 Id. sec. 112.

"'The declarations of the deceased, whether before or after the
alleged testamentary act, are competent in corroboration of other
evidence of the mainfacts, but insufficient in and of themselves to
prove either of the essential ingredients." Ferguson v Billups, 244
Ky. 85, 86, 50 S.W 2d 35 (1932)

"Declarations of the alleged testa-

tor, before and after the supposed testamentary act, are competent
in corroboration of other evidence of the main fact to which the
declarations are addressed."
Wood v. Wood, 241 Ky. 506, 508-509, 44
S.W 2d 539, 540 (1931). '
post-testamentary declarations of the
testator as to the contents of a lost will are admissible in corroboration of other evidence." Atherton v Gaslin, 194 Ky. 460, 468, 239
"

S.W 771, 774 (1922)
'In re Morrison's Estate, 198 Calif. 1, 242 Pac. 939 (1926)
Schnee v. Schnee,"61 Kan. 643, 60 Pac. 738 (1900), MCKELVEY,
EVIDENCE (5th ed. 1944) sec. 212.
1 P D. 154 (1876).
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in England but its authority has been seriously questioned. 8 it
has been repudiated by the United State Supreme Court, 9 but
.among the states there is a conflict of authority 10
The Kentucky Court has declared on numerous occasions
that, "The declarations of the deceased, whether before or after
-the alleged testamentary act, are competent in corroboration of
other evidence of the main facts, but are insufficient in and of
-hemselves to prove either of the essential ingredients. '"" That
statement would indicate that the testator's oral declarations
.are freely admissible as direct evidence of any one of the es-sential elements, the only restriction being that they be used as
-corroborative and not as the sole evidence in the case. Such has
'been the view taken by commentators as to the rule in Kentuckv 12 But a careful examination of the cases reveals that the
rule actually applied by the courts is much more limited in
scope.
M1uch of the confusion results from the admitted admissibilitv of the testator's declarations to prove that a will once
-validly executed was never revoked. In such cases the testator's
state of mind is a material factor and wherever a person's state
of mind is relevant to an issue that person's own statements
made in a natural manner in the normal course of affairs may
be admitted as evidence of the mental condition.1 3 In order to
constitute a valid revocation of a will there must be, not only
a revocatory act, but the act must be accompanied by an intent to
Tevoke.i 4 Regardless of the act of revocation, if the testator lacks
the intent to revoke there is no revocation.1 5 Thus when the propounder of a lost will proves the due execution and the contents
' "I do not desire to be understood as dissenting from the judgment of the majority of the Court of Appeals in Sugden v. Lord St.
Leonards
I have expressed the doubts which I entertain; all I
desire is to leave the question open should it hereafter come before
your Lordships' House for decision." (Lord Herschell in Woodward v.
-Goulstone, L.R. 11 App. Cas. 469, 480-481 (1886))
Throckmorton v. Holt, 180 U. S. 552, 45 L. Ed. 663, 21 Sup. Ct.
474 (1901)
]O6 WIGMORE, op. cit. supra note 4, sec. 1736.
" Ferguson v. Billups, 244 Ky. 85, 86, 50 S.W 2d 35 (1932) and
,cases there cited.
'2 6 WIGMORE, op. cit. supra note 4, sec. 1736, note 3.
" 6 Id. sec. 1725.
4 Ky. R. S. (1946)
sec. 394.080.
"Allison's Devisees v. Allison's Heirs, 37 Ky. (7 Dana) 90 (1838).
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of the will and is burdened with the further task of proving that
the will was never revoked by the testator, the most direct evidence of the non-revocation is proof that the testator never entertained any intent to revoke. That lack of intent to revoke may
be shown either in a positive manner as where a testator, after
receiving kiiowledge of the destruction of a will, demonstrated
that the destruction occurred without any intent to revoke, 16 or
in a negative manner by proving that the testator continued
until his death to be satisfied with the will as execnted. 17 In
either event it is the testator's mental state that is in issue and
his own declarations are clearly admissible to show that mental
condition.
When a will is last seen in possession of the testator but
cannot be found after his death, there is a presumption that it
was destroyed by him with an intent to revoke.is In such cases
the declarations of the testator may be admitted to overcome this
presumption." ' There is some question as to whether or not the
presumption can be overcome by the testator's declarations
alone. As indicated above the usual statement in the Kentucky
cases is to the effect that the declarations of the testator are
admissible as corroborative only and are insufficient in and of
themselves to establish any one of the essential ingredients of a
lost will. That would seem to indicate that even though the execution and contents of a will were clearly shown, its nonrevocation could not be proved unless there was at least some
evidence of non-revocation other than the testator's own statements. However, in Steele v Price,2 the case often cited as
establishing the doctrine in Kentucky, the only evidence of nonrevocation other than the testator's own statements was evidence
that the testator was a drunkard, a careless man, and one who
'"Steele v. Price, 44 Ky (5 B. Mon.) 58 (1844)
'Baltzell v. Ates, 181 Ky 415, 205 S.W 548 (1918).
' Ferguson v. Billups, 244 Ky 85, 50 S.W 2d 35 (1932) Baltzell
v. Ates, 181 Ky 415 205 S.W 548 (1918), Webster v. Lowe, 107 Ky
293, 21 Ky L. Rep. 998, 53 S.W 1030 (1899) Mercer v. Mercer's
Adm'r., 87 Ky 21, 9 Ky L. Rep. 870, 7 S.W 307 (1888).
" Rowland v. Holt, 25-R Ky 718, 70 S.W 2d 5 (1934) Baltzell v.
Ates, 181 Ky. 415, 205 S.W 548 (1918), Steele v. Price, 44 Ky (5 B.
Mon.) 58 (1844).
' 44 Ky (5 B. Mon.) 58 (1844).

LOST WILLS-ORAL DECLARATIONS

would be likely to casually lose a will or other valuable docunient.
In Baltzell v Ales 21 the will was last seen in tile hands of
the testator but could not be found after his death. The only
evidence offered to establish its non-revocation was evidence of
the testator's oral declarations. The jury was given a peremptory
instruction to find in favor of the will. The Court of Appeals
reversed the decision but only because of the peremptory instruction, stating that it was for the jury to decide whether or
not the will had been revoked. Thus the court seemed to approve the proposition that it is competent for a jury to find that
a will was never revoked even though the only evidence of nonrevocation consists of oral declarations of the testator.
In the more recent case of Pritchardv Harvey2 2 there was
the usual presumption of revocation of the will and the only
evidence to overcome the presumption was evidence of oral declarations of the testator. It was decided that these declarations
standing alone could not overcome the presumption. However,
the declarations themselves were discussed by the court and it
was found that they were so vague and equivocal that even if
they were accepted no definite conclusion could be drawn from
them. Therefore, it is doubtful if this case can be said to actually
rule on the question whether or not the declarations of the testator, if clear and specific, caii overcome the presumption of a
revocation. The court did not question the authoritv of Baltzell
v. Ates, and there is no reason to suppose that the proposition
laid down by implication in that case is not sound law. Assuming that it should be followed, it is difficult to understand the
meaning of the court's repeated statement that evidence of a
testator's declarations are admissible as corroborative evidence
only but are insufficient in and of themselves to prove an- one
of the essential ingredients. A more accurate statement would
appear to be to the effect that once the due execution and the
contents of a will were clearly shown, then the declarations of
the testator could be admitted to prove that the will was nev'r
revoked.
181 Ky 415, 205 S.W 548 (1918)
=272 Ky 58, 113 S.W 2d 865 (1938)

21
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When the testator's statements are admitted for the purposes outlined above, they are not admitted to prove the truth of
the statements but rather to prove the condition of the mind of
the testator when he made them. The propounder of the will
seeks to prove that the will was never revoked by proving that
there was never any intent to revoke. The statements made are
then collateral to the main fact sought to be proved. The evidence offered is that the statements were made, not that the
statements were either true or false. In such a case no question
of hearsay can be raised. The testator's statement that he had
casually lost a will and intended to make another like it may be
23
admitted to show that there was no intent to revoke the will.

The declaration is not evidence of the manner of the loss but
tends to show the mental state of the loser. A testator's persistent statements that he had given everything to his wife are admissible as evidence that he did not entertain any intention of
revoking a will which he had executed accomplishing that purpose.2 4 Evidence of a negative sort that the testator never exhibited any dissatisfaction with a particular will is likewise admissible.2 5 A testator's statement that a will was destroyed at
his orders is admissible as evidence that it was destroyed with
an intent to revoke it.2 6 Evidence of acts or conduct have the
same tendency to prove intent as declarations, and are admitted
on the same theory as the declarations. They are admitted, not
to prove the acts or conduct, but to prove the state of mind
which is thereby revealed. Thus evidence of a contract made by
the testatrix was admitted to show a fixed intention to provide
27
for certain persons actually provided for in a will.

No ease has been found in Kentucky in which the declarations of the testator have been admitted to prove the due execution of a lost will. The cases refusing such evidence have apparentlv become the basis for the supposition that such declarations are admissible for that purpose if they are merely in support of other evidence. In Chisholm's Heirs v Ben, Celia, &c "' s
ISteele v. Price, 44 Ky (7 B. Mon.) 58 (1844).
-'Baltzell v. Ates, 181 Ky 415, 205 S.W 548 (1918)
SBeall v Cunningham, 42 Ky. (3 B. Mon.) 390 (1843)
"Beauchamp's Will, 20 Ky (4 T. B. Mon.) 361 (1827).
-7Combs v. Shields' Ex'r., 270 Ky 232, 109 S.W 2d (01 (1937).
2146 Ky (7 B. Mon.) 408 (1847)
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-there was no unimpeached testimony concerning the due execution other than evidence that the testator during his lifetime
,exhibited a sealed paper which he declared to be his will and
that during the last two years of his life he stated repeatedly
that he had made a will. It was held that due execution was not
established but there was some indication that if it were a case
.of clear spoliation where it could be otherwise shown that the
will had been fraudulently destroyed, due execution might be
-established by such oral declarations. Although the case could
well have been disposed of on the ground of lack of proper exe-cution alone the court discussed each of the three essential elements necessary to the establishment of a lost will. In stating
that the declarations of the testator were admissible to prove
that the will had never been revoked the court said that such
corroborative only, even upon that question,
-evidence was "
"29 There was no
the lowest species of evidence,
being
explanation of what was meant by that statement and little
indication of what the evidence was intended to corroborate.
The apparent conclusion that has been drawn, though never
.actuallv applied, seems to be that the court intended to hold that
the evidence was admissible.as corroborative of any one of the
main facts necessary to the establishment of the will.
In M1ercer's Adm'r v Mackin"° the only evidence of the
execution of an alleged lost will were repeated statements by
the supposed testator that he had made a will, had written it all
himself, and did not intend to live a day without a will. There
was also much circumstantial evidence that the testator desired
to dispose of his property in the manner provided for in the will.
The will was not sustained, the court saying that the execution of
a lost will could not be established by the declarations of the
testator alone. The only affirmative statements in the opinion
-concerning the admissibility of such evidence were to the effect
that it would have been admissible in case the will had been
fraudulently destroyed, and even there, itwas said, the fraudulent destruction must first be clearly established.
In refusing to permit the due execution of a will to be
.shown by the testator's declarations in the cases mentioned above
Id. at 414.
'77 Ky. (14 Bush) 434 (1879).
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it is doubtful if the court intended to reserve any situation for
the admission of such declarations except possibly in cases of
fraudulent destruftion. Certainly they cannot be admitted to
prove proper execution, as they are admitted when the question of non-revocation is in issue, on the theory that they are
evidence of the testator's state of mind. In the absence of a
question of lack of capacity, the fact of execution or nonexecution does not ordinarily depend upon the state of mind of
the testator, but rather upon what was done. Whether or not
the will was in writing, signed by the testator, attested and
subscribed by the proper number of witnesses, etc., are the pertinent facts to be proved. The best that can be said for oral
declarations by the testator is that they constitute evidence That
the testator believed that he had done all that was necessary to
the execution of a valid will. In this it is quite possible that he
may have been seriously mistaken.
It is likewise doubtful whether the dicta in Chsholm's Heirs
v Ben, Celia, &c and Mercer's Adrn'r v. Mackzn to the effect

that the oral declarations of the testator are admissible to prove
the execution of a will that has been fraudulently destroyed are
of much value. The wrongful destruction should not be allowed
to alter the rule against hearsay evidence. However, if the dicta
are taken to mean nothing more than that additional evidence is
not necessary to the establishment of a will that has been fraudulently destroyed they are probably sound, although an appropriate case for its application has not been found. In such a
case, it would be the presumption that exists against a spoliator,31 not the admission of hearsay evidence, that would establish the will. It has been held that the wrongful destruction of
an evidentiary document by a litigant creates a presumption
that it was properly executed 32 and that its contents were as
When a document is fraudulently destroyed by a litigant, the
jury is usually allowed to draw an inference that the instrument,
if it could be produced, would support the claim of the adversary In

re Holmes' Estate, 98 Colo. 360, 56 P 2d 1333 (1936), Evans, Torts
to Expectanczes sn Decedents' Estates (1944) 93 U. OF PA. L. REV.
187, 197.
12 In an action on a promissory note it was held that if the jury
found that the defendant gave the note for valuable consideration

and later destroyed the note, they had a right to infer that it was
properly executed. Sullivan v. Sullivan, 188 Mass. 380, 74 N.E. 608
(1905)

LOST WILLS-ORAL DECLARATIONS

alleged by the adversary 33 Thus when the fraudulent destruction of a will is clearly shown a presumption might well be
raised that it was executed in compliance with the statute and
that its contents were as alleged by the propounder. Evidence
of the testator's oral declarations might then be admitted to
show that he never entertained any intention of revoking the
will.
Wigmore includes Kentuckv among those states which have
iivoked a special exception to the hearsay rule in order to admit
oral declarations of the testator to prove lost wills, 3 4 and cites

four Kentucky cases 35 as holding that such utterances may be
used to prove the will's contents. When these cases are examined
it is difficult to see how any of them can be said to establish
any such rule other than as mere dicta.
In Muler v Mudler 36 certain contestants who were not
notified of the probate proceedings appealed to the circuit court
on the ground that the will admitted to probate had been revoked
by a subsequent will. The alleged subsequent will had been lost.
Its due execution was properly proved. The circuit court then
excluded all evidence of the contents of the lost will on the
ground of immateriality and instructed the jurv that if any
subsequent will had been properly executed the prior will was
revoked. The Court of Appeals reversed and held that even
though the subsequent will had been executed it did not revoke
the prior will unless it contained a revocation clause or made an
inconsstent disposition of property The court then stated,
vithout citing any authority, that the declarations of the testa-

tor would be competent evidence of the contents. However, there
was no indication in the opinion that any such declarations had
been offered in evidence and there was no apparent rtason for
the statement.
=Some courts have held that the wrongful destruction of such
a document by a litigant creates a conclusive presumption that the
contents were as claimed by the adversary Middleton v. Middleton,
188 Ark. 1022, 68 S.W 2d 1003 (1934)

n'6 WIGMORE, op. cit. supra note 4, sec. 1736, note 3.

' Rowland v. Holt, 253 Ky 718, 70 S.W 2d 5 (1934) Wood v.
Wood, 241 Ky. 506, 44 S.W 2d 539 (1931) Atherton v. Gaslin, 194
Ky 460, 239 S.W 771 (1922) Muller v. Muller, 108 Ky. 511, 56 S.W
802 (1900).
•' 108 Ky 511, 56 S.W 802 (1900).
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was not a case of a lost will but a case
of an alleged forgery Evidence of the testator's statements as
to the contents of his will were admitted but they were not admitted for the purpose of proving contents. They were admitted
collaterally to show that his statements as to the contents were
consistent with the contents of the instrument offered and in
that manner to disprove the accusation of forgery In such a
case where the fact of the statements of another rather than the
truth of his statements is material no question of hearsay can be
raised. It certainly is not authority for the proposition that the
testator's declarations as to the contents of a will are admissible
to prove those contents. The court did say in its opimon, without
any citation of authority, that long before Sugden v. Lord St.
we had adopted the rule that post-testamentary
Leonard; "
declarations of the testator as to the contents of a lost will are
admissible in corroboration of other evidence. "' s If the court
meant to sa- that such utterances are admissible to prove the
contents they certainly went far beyond what was necessary to
the decision of the case in hand, and it is difficult to find where
they found authority for saying that the rule had been adopted
long before.
In Wood v Wood 39 there was no evidence of the will except
that of oral declarations of the testator. Although denying probate, the court made certain statements 40 to the effect that such
declarations were admissible when in corroboration of other
evidence. But since there was no opportunity for the application of the thesis announced, these statements are mere dicta
and as such cannot be given the effect of a rule of law.

Atherton v. Gasli

In Rowland v Holt4l evidence that the testator declared
on numerous occasions, continuing until shortly before his death,
that lns will was of a certain tenor was admitted. The statements
thus admitted were of the contents of the will. However, both the
contents and the due execution were otherwise satisfactorily
proved and the evidence offered was for the purpose of showmg
" 194 Ky. 460, 239 S.W 771 (1922)
"'Atherton v Gaslin, 194 Ky 460, 468, 239 S.W 771, 774 (1922)_
'241 Ky 506, 44 S.W 2d 539 (1931)
" 0Wood v. Wood, 241 Ky. 506, 510, 44 S.W 2d 539, 540 (1931).
"253 Ky 718, 70 S.W 2d 5 (1934).
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the testator's continued satisfaction with the will and to thereby
rebut any presumption that it had been revoked. The evidence
was not admitted to prove the contents of the will.
There are ample dicta in the Kentucky cases to the effect
that the oral declarations of an alleged testator, made either before or after the execution of the will, are admissible to corroborate other evidence of due execution, contents, or non-revocation
of the will. No case- has been found where the evidence has been
actually used for any purpose except to prove the non-revocation
by the testator. Here the evidence is used collaterally to show
the testator's state of mind, the state of mind being a material
factor in the determination of whether or not the will was revoked. Should the evidence be used to prove either of the other
two essential ingredients the effect would be to admit the testator's oral statements as to what he had done to prove that such
things were done. Such declarations are clearly hearsay and it is
difficult to find any logical reason for creating a special exception for them. If a deceased person's statements that he had
made a will of a certain tenor may be used to prove that he made
the will, there appears to be no reason why his statements could
not be admitted to prove a deed, promissory note. or other instrument.
It is very unlikely that it would be sound policy to admit
the oral declarations of an alleged testator to prove the executon or contents of a lost will. It would be an invitation to fraud
of the grossest kind by making the establishment of spurious
wills a comparatively easy matter. It gives third persons an opportunity to come in and testify as to the oral statements of the
testator after his own lips have been sealed by death. He no
longer has an opportunity to either affirm or deny and the sole
requirement for the admission of the declarations is that the
declarant be dead. In no other field of the law is there such a
broad exception to the hearsay rule. Even if we assume that the
testifying witnesses would always tell the truth, the admission of
such evidence is still unsound. Persons often make false or misleading statements when talking about their own wills for the
very purpose of concealing the truth. There is probably no subject about which one is less likely to tell the truth than that of

442
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the contents of his own will. ie may have various reasons for
wishmn to keep the matter secret, and it would be dangerous indeed to permit the statements he might have made with intent
to mslead or mystify curious or expectant relatives to be used
as the truth in establishing the will after his death.
Although some courts have actually used the declarations of
the testator to prove the execution and contents of a lost will,
it is believed that such is unsound in principle and that the
dicta supporting such a view in Kentucky should be repudiated.
BERTEL A.

SPARKS.

